

به نام خدا  
آزمون ترجمه



@ جملات زیر را به فارسی ترجمه کنید. در ترجمه خود به ساختارهای پیچیده زبانی، لغات تخصصی و معادل‌گزینی مناسب دقت کنید.

(۱) ترجمه ساختارهای پیچیده:

- My central thesis is that both the conception of rights characteristically invoked by those engaged in this type of conflict over rights, and the rhetorical procedures used to advance claims to rights embodying this conception, are such that to invoke them or employ them is already to have entangled oneself in error. (۲۰ نمره)

متن کامل این پاراگراف در انتهای آزمون با عنوان COMMUNITY, LAW, AND THE IDIOM AND RHETORIC OF RIGHTS آمده است.

- Tolstoy remained an admirer of Rousseau, and late in life still recommended Emile as the best book ever written on education. Rousseau must have strengthened, if he did not actually originate, his growing tendency to idealize the soil and its cultivators --the simple peasant, who for Tolstoy is a repository of almost as rich a stock of 'natural' virtues as Rousseau's noble savage. (۲۰ نمره)

(۲) ترجمه واژگان تخصصی

- Under a capitalist system, the infrastructure was private ownership of the means of production by the bourgeoisie, which, due to relentless mechinization and other developments, forced more and more people into wage labor. But superstructure is referring to culture, including systems of belief,

societal mores, and even some aspects of government and law not directly related to property relations. (۲ نمره)

- In finance, they started hedge funds, or formed private equity and venture capital firms, benefiting from favorable tax treatment of debt and capital gains, and more recently from a rising stock market and low interest rates. (۱۰ نمره)

متن کامل این پاراگراف در انتهای آزمون با عنوان Buying Power آمده است.

- For many on the left in the Sixties, the problem was that the masses, unlike themselves of course, suffered from false consciousnesses. (۱ نمره)

متن کامل این جمله در انتهای آزمون با عنوان Awareness-raising makes you sick آمده است.

- Few topics have animated today's chattering classes more than capitalism. (۳ نمره)

متن کامل این جمله در انتهای آزمون با عنوان Slavery and Capitalism آمده است.

- The French economist Thomas Piketty attained rock-star status with a 700-page book full of tables and statistics and the succinct but decisively unsexy title *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*. (۲ نمره)

- The logic consists of two major enterprises, which Kant calls the transcendental analytic and the transcendental dialectic. The analytic sets out the criteria for the valid empirical employment of the understanding; the dialectic exposes the illusions that arise when reason tries to operate outside the limits set by the analytic. In his analytic Kant lays out a set of a priori concepts which he

calls 'categories,' and a set of a priori judgements which he calls 'principles'. (نمره ۷)

@ با وفاداری کامل به محتوا، جمله‌های زیر را به فارسی روان و ویراسته بازنویسی کنید:

- مورخین تجربه‌گرایی سنتی بریتانیایی با سوءظن، بدانچه آن را یک تجلی دیگر از وسواس اروپای قاره‌ای در تئوری‌گرایی به جای تأکید بر تجربه‌گرایی و واقعیت‌های سفت‌وسخت می‌دانستند می‌نگریستند. (نمره ۵)
- در این روش که از آن در روانشناسی به‌عنوان «تقویت» یاد می‌شود برای افزایش و تکرار و تثبیت عمل و رفتاری، پس از آنکه تربیت‌شونده، رفتاری مطلوب از خود نشان داد یک محرک که از نظر شخص تربیت‌شونده مطلوب می‌باشد، ارائه می‌گردد. (نمره ۵)

@ پاراگراف‌های زیر را، با حفظ لحن آن‌ها، به فارسی ترجمه کنید:

- Suppose there was a king who loved a humble maiden and whose heart was unaffected by the wisdom that is so often loudly preached. Let then the harp be tuned. Let the songs of the poets begin. Let everyone be festive, while love celebrates its triumph. For love is over-joyed when it unites equals, but it is triumphant when it makes equal that which was un- equal. Let the king's love reign!(نمره ۶)
- The public could not thank my illustrious predecessor enough for giving them water in the desert. By contrast with the highly complex and explosive styles being developed on all sides, the measured cadences of his writing proved mildly and agreeably surprising. It was as though fluency, clarity, and simplicity, the patron goddesses of the average man, had returned to earth. Those who prefer the sort of writing that gives them pleasure without

requiring much thought took an immediate fancy to his work, whose seductive charm lay in its totally unaffected appearance, whose limpidity sometimes allowed a deeper thought, but nothing to mystify: his work remains, however, unfailingly readable, if not wholly reassuring. He perfected the art of brushing lightly over the most serious ideas and problems. Nothing in his book gives the least difficulty unless it be the wonder itself of encountering none. (۹ نمره).

\* متن بالا بخشی از خطابه پل والرئ در مراسم تجلیل از آناتول فرانتس است.

## COMMUNITY, LAW, AND THE IDIOM AND RHETORIC OF RIGHTS

Contention over rights is endemic in our modern North American culture. Sometimes such disagreement takes place *within* a legal system, whether federal or state, and about the application or interpretation either of statutes or of constitutional provisions. With this type of disagreement I shall not be concerned here. My topic is rather that of how we ought to respond to the manifest and often fundamental disagreements over what rights individuals and groups possess (independent of and antecedent to the enactments of positive law), rights alleged to provide standards to which the enactments of positive law ought to conform. My central thesis is that both the conception of rights characteristically invoked by those engaged in this type of conflict over rights, and the rhetorical procedures used to advance claims to rights embodying this conception, are such that to invoke them or employ them is already to have entangled oneself in error. The dominant contemporary idiom and rhetoric of rights cannot serve genuinely rational purposes, and we ought not to conduct our moral and political arguments in terms derived from that idiom and rhetoric. **In** so saying, I formulate a position at odds not only with liberal proponents of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, but also with utterances of, for example, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops. My quarrel in this latter case is not, or not necessarily, with the substance of what the bishops have intended to assert on a variety of moral and political matters; but insofar as the form of their assertions has involved an appeal, or has appeared to involve an appeal, to a dubious idiom and rhetoric of rights, I believe that the bishops, quite inadvertently, may have injured their own case. So it is, for example, in those sterile debates over abortion where the issue has been posed in terms that produce an apparent conflict between claims about the rights of the unborn and

claims about the rights of women to be free in making their choices. What then is it about the contemporary.

#### THE NEED FOR AN INDEPENDENT STANDARD

Rational debate over the application of moral, indeed, more generally, of evaluative concepts, requires that there be some standard, independent of the desires, preferences, and wills of the contending parties, to which appeal can be made in trying to show why the reasons supporting one point of view are superior to those supporting another. In the absence of such a standard, there is nothing to distinguish genuinely rational moral or evaluative disagreements from any other clash of conflicting desires, preferences, and wills. So the appeal must be away from what I want or feel (or even from what I would want or feel, were I to have the kind of wants and feelings which I do not now have, but do now want to have), to some set of considerations which are genuinely independent of my, or your, or her, or his nonrational nature, to something that in virtue of our shared rationality we can recognize as binding us to judge and to act in one way rather than in another. Yet it is not only rational debate which requires such an independent standard. For, in the absence of such a standard, not only will I have no way of evaluating as better or worse reasons for judging and acting in particular ways those reasons which I offer to others; neither will I have any way of so evaluating those reasons for judging and acting in particular ways which I offer to myself. So, I will be unable to function as a genuinely rational agent. Of course, we often seem to ourselves to be functioning as genuinely rational agents when we are in fact disguising from ourselves by means of a parade of reason-giving that we are acting, not at all from the reasons adduced, but from unadmitted desires and preferences. And just as often, in a similar way, we seem to ourselves to be engaging in genuinely rational

debate, when we are in fact disguising from ourselves that we are participating in nothing more than a clash of desires, preferences, and wills. Such self-deception is not only one of the dangers of the *individual* moral life. It can become socially institutionalized, so that the status of rational debate becomes officially or semiofficially accorded to episodes which are in fact contests of quite another kind. And in both types of case there will be forces at work that resist acknowledgment of the fact that individual self-deception or socially collaborative false consciousness have succeeded in obscuring or preventing the application of the distinction between rational agency and rational debate on one hand, and their deceptive *simulacra* on the other. As to the variety of psychic and social devices by means of which such acknowledgment can be successfully resisted, we still have a great deal to learn from Klein and Winnicott, and from Lukacs and Mannheim. But both the psychoanalytic and the NeoMarxist and PostMarxist approaches suffer from having inherited a defective notion of what practical rationality, whether expressed in agency or in debate, is, and so also from inadequacy in making the required distinctions. What conception of rationality do we then need? Modern philosophers have sometimes aspired to provide conceptions of practical rationality which are as abstract and formal as possible. That is to say, they have hoped to be able to characterize practical rationality independently of any set of substantive beliefs which a particular agent might happen to hold. Thus, an agent's practical rationality or lack of it is thought to be apparent in the way in which she or he acts on the basis of some set of beliefs, whatever these might be. What is mistaken in this approach is best suggested by an example, that of the paranoid agent, all of whose policies and actions presuppose a belief in the hostile and persecutory purposes of those with whom he or she is dealing. Such a belief controls the way in which evidence about the purposes of others is gathered and

evaluated, just as does a more normal belief in the general and *prima facie* trustworthiness of others. Hence, characteristically a paranoid person who is confronted by and rejects the evidence supporting a belief in such trustworthiness is not failing in rationality thereby; for, given his or her belief, that appeal to evidence is question-begging. His or her lack of practical rationality is rather a matter of his or her substantive belief. Not only mentally disordered persons fail in this way; Machiavelli advised Lorenzo de Medici and all princes that human beings generally are "ungrateful, fickle, pretenders and dissemblers" and should be treated as untrustworthy. In such a world, appeals to shared rational standards would inevitably be vain, and practical rationality could only be understood as consisting in choosing the most efficient means to achieve what one desires. But this diminished conception of practical rationality itself may blind us to the irrationality of Machiavelli's substantive belief. What then are the substantive beliefs which we must hold if we aspire to be practically rational agents and to engage in genuinely rational debate? I have already suggested one such belief: that we inhabit a type of community within which the rival participants in debate can be treated as *prima facie* trustworthy. Such belief may be reinforced on occasion by the acceptance within some particular community of sanction-bearing norms. So it is within the contemporary community of natural scientists, within which trustworthiness in the communication of data afforded by observation and experiment is in part grounded upon shared allegiance to a norm which requires that those who falsify data should be expelled from the scientific community. But a shared belief in mutual trustworthiness, though necessary, is not sufficient to secure the possibility of genuinely rational debate. What more is needed in the way of shared beliefs? Aristotle gave us excellent reasons for believing that both rational enquiry in politics and ethics and rationality in action require

membership in a community which shares allegiance to some tolerably specific overall conception of the ultimate human good. Such a community initially may possess only a bare outline of such a conception, in which much has so far been left implicit, but that it should move to a more and more explicit and detailed understanding of that good is indeed a central task of such enquiry. For it is only in light of such a shared understanding that different types of activity and institution, each with its own subordinate good or set of goods, can be adequately ordered in terms of that ultimate good. What such a shared understanding provides is precisely the kind of standard independent of, not only individual desires, preferences, and wills, but also of the interests of particular groups within the community, by appeal to which rational debate on practical questions can be carried on. To spell out what allegiance to some such conception of the ultimate human good involves is to say what it is towards which the life and activities of the community as a whole are directed. Different types of social arrangement and relationship will be evaluated insofar as they do or do not contribute to the achievement of that good. And the different offices within the community and the services to the community conferred by those holding such offices will be evaluated in accordance with the contribution which each makes to the overall good of the community. The virtue which is exemplified in giving due recognition and reward to each office and person according to its or his or her contribution to the overall life of the community is the virtue of justice. Justice thus finds expression in norms governing set forms of human relationship, norms which specify what each person participating in relationship owes to each other person so participating. The word used of such a relationship specifying norm in Roman law was *Ius*, but we can identify the existence and recognition of such norms in many cultures where there is no single word for them. Rational discussion in any particular society of whether

the presently institutionalized and acknowledged *jura*. are indeed what justice requires depends therefore upon prior rational agreement as to the nature of justice, and rational enquiry into the nature of justice depends in turn upon prior agreement on the nature of the good, and more fundamentally still upon those background beliefs in terms of which good is defined and understood. But of course, it also matters whether or not, in such discussions, debates and enquiries, those who are advancing the reasons in favor of one point of view rather than another are in fact subjecting themselves in good faith to the standards of rational argument, rather than using the procedures of rational debate as a means of feigning such subjection, while in fact they are advancing their own private interests, so that an appearance of reason-giving and reason-evaluating disguises a reality of self-aggrandizing desires and preferences. For unless the participants in a community, in whose common life rational debate and enquiry play a key part, are able generally to trust each other in this respect, such debate and enquiry will not be sustainable. So a shared belief in the trustworthiness of the members of such a community by those members themselves is as crucial to the constitution of a community of rational debate as is a shared set of beliefs concerning the good. . . . What would happen in a society in which shared beliefs in a particular conception of an ultimate human good and in the general trustworthiness of the members of that society were first eroded, and then to a large and significant degree destroyed? Three important consequences would be apt to ensue. First, loss of a shared belief in the nature of the good would deprive the participants in debates over particular moral or evaluative issues of a common standard of judgment, and arguments advanced on one side or the other would lack a major premise to which even those who dissented from the conclusions of those arguments could agree. And the tendency would be for more and more matters of moral and political substance

to become contestable. Secondly, this development, reinforced by a lessening of belief in the trustworthiness of those with whom one entered into moral disagreement, would strengthen tendencies to construe appeals to principle as nothing more than disguised expressions of desire, preference, and will, whether recognized or not recognized as such by those making these appeals. The distinction between genuine rational debate and the feigning of rationality would have become increasingly more difficult to apply. And thirdly, a new need would arise for norms whose central purpose would be protective: to defend each person from becoming merely an instrument for the achievement of someone else's desires, preferences, and will. And whatever resulted from attempts to meet this need would involve a restructuring, and new understanding, of key moral concepts. Justice could no longer be understood exclusively or even primarily as a matter of sustaining and repairing the breaches in an order in which allocations were in respect of contributions to a good, in shared allegiance to which social cooperation found its warrant. For there could be no longer any such shared allegiance or any shared standard of desert in respect of such contributions. The norms governing a variety of social relationships therefore would no longer be evaluated as they had been formerly. The appeal to such norms, to *jura*, would be transformed into a claim that we ought to accord recognition to some protected area, not to be invaded by others, at least without the permission of the person possessing the *jus*. And the claim to be entitled to such protection, to possess a *jus*, since it could not be grounded in the relationship of that *jus* to the ultimate human good, would have to be grounded in some other way; moreover, this would have to be achieved, as we have already noticed, in a social context in which all such normative and evaluative claims increasingly would be treated as contestable.

## SOME OBJECTIONS AND HISTORICAL REMARKS

This story which I have been telling in abstract and general terms can be translated into the concrete and particular story of our own society at the threshold of modernity. Two features of that concrete and particular story need to be emphasized. The first anticipates a simple-minded misreading of it to which hostile critics of this narrative are apt to resort. "You are telling us," they say, "that there was once an ideal society in which a perfect, conflict-free moral order, informed by a shared understanding of the good, by justice and other virtues, was exemplified in social life. But this is a piece of mythology, not history. There never was such a society." Of course there was not, and those such as myself against whom such an accusation has been levelled have never for a moment supposed or said that there was. What we have claimed is that in the course of the transition to modernity there was the loss of a society partially governed, and imperfectly informed, by the ideal of such an order, and never in a conflict-free way, and that the loss even of *that* in exchange for the impoverished moral orders of modernity raises the sharpest of questions. Secondly, it is important to remark just when and what the key moments of transition in that concrete and particular history were. One such moment was that during which a new meaning for '*jus*' and '*jura*' emerged, one that makes it possible to translate those expressions by 'right' and 'rights' in our modern sense of those words. For Aquinas, as for his predecessors, a *jus* is a moral rule governing human relationships, one that embodies justice in institutionalized or at least institutionalizable form and is justified, as the virtue of justice itself is, by reference to the good which is the end of that teleological order with which God has endowed the world. A *jus naturale* is an invariant rule required by justice to hold, not in this or that set of social circumstances, but in all times and places. There are by contrast rules not thus invariant, among them the rules of

justice governing particular relations of property and servitude in different social circumstances, relations which must be such so as not to infringe justice, but which may legitimately vary. What led on to a new use and meaning for '*jus*' was the development of a controversy over property, in which a succession of Franciscan writers, most notably Duns Scotus, argued that *dominium* was contrary to the *jus naturale*, *dominium* being understood as conferring upon those who possessed it exclusive control and disposal over whatever it might be, even against the claims of those in desperate need. In controverting those Franciscans in the bull *Quia vir reprobus*, Pope John XXII accepted from them this understanding of *dominium*, but declared it to be what God had endowed human beings with as an invariant attribute of their nature, not something arising out of particular social relationships. Hence, almost accidentally, a conception of a right attached to individuals as such, independent of the place and status of such individuals in a community, let alone their contribution to its common good, was introduced, a conception which thereafter, beginning with William of Ockham's rejoinder to John XXII, became increasingly central to political and legal thought and practice. And '*jus*' and '*jura*' were thenceforward used to name such rights. (My account follows closely and is largely indebted to that by Richard Tuck in *Natural Rights Theories*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 18-23; but he should not be held responsible for my way of understanding his narrative. For Aquinas, see *Summa Theologiae* Ia-IIae 94,5; for Duns Scotus, see *Quaestiones in Iulium Sententiarum* 15,2). So linguistic innovation combined with social change to provide just the kind of moral and legal concept required for the emergence of the distinctively modern concept of 'a right.' Its emergence was thus an unintended outcome of the inability of Christian theologians to settle through rational debate disputed issues concerning the nature of Christian community and the places of both

voluntary poverty and various forms of property in the life of that community. It is cause for salutary, if ironic, reflection that it was the failure of John XXII, the same pope who canonized Aquinas, to draw not only upon Aquinas's specific thoughts about *jus naturale* and *dominium*, but more generally upon Aquinas's philosophical and theological account of the virtues and of practical rationality, in his response to the rebellious Franciscans, which at a key moment played a crucial part in displacing that earlier scheme of moral and political thought, whose supreme expression was found in Aquinas's writings. Just as in our own time, a rhetoric designed to achieve political effectiveness obscured what was genuinely at issue for rational agents. What was thereby generated was a conception of right which can be contrasted with the older conception of '*jus*' in four salient respects. First, because claims to rights seemed to be no longer derivable from a conception of the virtue of justice grounded in a teleological order and, more specifically, an order at once created and commanded by God, they had to find some other mode of rational justification; at the same time, the task of rational justification itself had to be reconceived just because all moral and evaluative claims had become increasingly contestable. From time to time thereafter it was asserted that such rational justification had now been achieved: claims to rights are justified, it was said, because true claims to rights are self-evident to all rational persons; or instead, it was said that claims to rights are to be justified by reference to the utility of conceding them, or at least some of them; or it was argued that claims to rights can be grounded by an appeal to contractarian considerations; and so on. But the protagonists of each of these theories have proved to be unable to refute their rivals in any conclusive way. And thus claims to rights did become, in the social milieus of modernity, essentially contestable, although not for that reason less frequent. Secondly, rights, since the Enlightenment less often spoken of as 'natural rights' and more

often as 'human rights,' were and are taken, following the usage of John XXII, to attach to individuals *qua* individuals, and not to individuals *qua* members of a particular community, or individuals *qua* members of a universal community, subject to divine and natural law. The individual *qua* individual, to be conceived apart from, and independently of, whatever social roles she or he may occupy, or whatever social relationships he or she may find him or herself in, is of course a distinctive member of the *dramatis personae* of emerging modernity. The peculiarly modern concept of the individual and the peculiarly modern concept of a right are indeed counterpart conceptions, which emerge together. But to what rights is the individual as such entitled? Here once again contestation prevails. Ever since the Declaration of Independence and that of the Rights of Man, rival catalogues of rights have been canvassed by different individuals and groups: rights not to be interfered with in action and utterance, rights to due process, rights to equal treatment, rights to preferential treatment, rights to be afforded enabling resources of various kinds, rights to be acknowledged and respected in various ways. This multiplication of claims to rights is scarcely surprising when it is recognized that the absence of any shared form of rational justification for claims to rights is accompanied by an absence of any shared criterion for identifying what particular rights there are and what the content of each particular right is. Thirdly, rights, conceived in this modern manner, are taken to provide standards by which to judge the adequacy or otherwise of systems of positive law and of a variety of social institutions, from a standpoint external to, and independent of, allegiance to that law or those institutions. They thus partially define a standpoint held to be more fundamental than any provided by participation in or membership of social groups. Evaluative and moral judgment are not to be understood, as they were on the older view, as the expression of a particular community's shared allegiances; the making of

such judgments is not something into which one has to be educated by a community, through which one expresses one's solidarity with that community, but is rather an expression of each individual's autonomy. So the degree to which a particular individual identifies him or herself with the life of the community in which he or she lives is always, on the modern view, conditional. For it is only if, and insofar as, the community satisfies the conditions prescribed by each particular individual's view of rights, that that individual has good reason so to identify. The virtues of familial loyalty and of patriotism are thereby put in question. Fourthly, rights so understood impose constraints upon what goals may legitimately be pursued, and how. The acknowledgment of their authority is to be required equally of and by all persons. It must therefore be such as to rely only upon considerations equally available to every individual, no matter how much those individuals may differ among themselves not only as to goals, but also as to other fundamental beliefs and forms of practice. Hence, the justification of rights in a modern culture must be, and be seen to be, wholly independent of religious or theological beliefs of any kind. But it is not just that such claims to rights must therefore be secular and nontheological; they are also to be construed so that, if warranted, they outweigh any claims which do appeal to theological considerations. They are therefore admirably suited to the purposes of individuals or groups who believe themselves restricted or restrained in any way by religious institutions or authorities. Given that rights have come to be understood as possessing this four-fold character (and I am ignoring the variety of sophisticated ways in which theories of rights, so conceived, can be further developed), claims to rights are well-designed to function as they do in much contemporary moral and political debate. Generally and characteristically they are used to present continually renewed challenges to what is taken by

those who present them to be the institutional *status quo*, challenges designed to dissolve the bonds, and undermine the authority, of all institutions intermediate between the individual on one hand and the government and the Justice system on the other: such institutions as families, schools, and churches. How far they are successful in doing this is generally and unsurprisingly, if the argument so far is correct, not a matter of how far their proponents are able to appeal to principles which those proponents are able to vindicate in rational debate with the spokespersons for the institutions thus criticized and attacked. For in a culture in which the boundaries of the contestable have been continually enlarged, and in which the conception of rights is one generated out of the same processes of social change whose outcome was to render questionable and contestable so much that had once not been so, the two contending parties generally do not share enough by way of first principles for such vindication to be possible. Hence, within each contending party in political debates about rights, that of those engaged in trying to advance some particular claim and that of those unwilling to concede that claim, what passes for rational justification and provides a substitute for it is characteristically a set of appeals to whatever principles express the contingent social agreements of the members of that party. The type of argument consequently deployed is apt therefore to be such as to secure without difficulty the assent of those who already agree with the particular conclusions argued, but has no compelling force for those outside. Rival models of rational justification flourish within each contending party. And as a consequence, all too often what appears to be rational argument functions instead as a kind of rhetorical device, giving a semblance of rational debate to the interchanges of groups, each of which is in fact only giving expression to its own partisan interests rather than participating in a common enterprise, whose end is to arrive at a genuinely rational solution to some set of disputed

questions. What I have argued, then, is that we inhabit a culture in which disagreements, and, more especially, fundamental disagreements, about rights cannot be rationally debated, and indeed that it was in key part because those beliefs and commitments which must be shared if a particular society is to be capable of rational debate were at an earlier stage no longer widely enough held, that the modern conception of rights developed in the way that it did. It follows that it is seriously imprudent, if one not only cares about advancing, sustaining, and protecting the goods of human life, but also counts rationality, theoretical and practical, as central among those goods, and believes that only rational modes of achieving one's social and moral ends are justifiable, to adopt the contemporary idiom and rhetoric of rights.

#### JUSTICE IN SERVICE OF A THEOLOGICALLY BASED NATURAL Law

What should we do and how should we speak instead? The answers to this question provide an agenda of problems and issues, need to restore the centrality of a conception of justice in the light of which we can formulate concerns about both desert and needs, in terms of an overall conception of a type of community once again informed by a shared conception of, and directed towards a shared achievement of, the ultimate human good. What is wrong with nonvoluntary poverty, we have to learn and to teach, is that it prevents people from cooperating with their neighbors in making and sustaining just that type of community, and contributing to that cooperation what they have to give. What is wrong with discrimination in terms of race or of sex in admission to the kind of educational opportunity which enables people so to contribute, is that it provides an unjust because irrelevant barrier to such contributions and such cooperation. But the removal of such barriers and the provision of enabling resources finds its point and purpose in the ends which justice serves, and not

simply in justice itself. Those ends involve the making and sustaining of what in each particular set of social circumstances will be a highly determinate kind of community in which each person can play her or his due part. As, and if, we thus move towards those ends, we shall reverse the sequence which Marx foresaw in the movement from socialist to communist justice; where Marx predicted a movement from a type of society governed by the maxim "From each according to his ability, to each according to his contribution" to one governed by "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs," we shall have to move from the justice of "From each according to her or his ability, to each according to his or her needs" to the justice of "From each according to her or his ability, to each according to his or her contribution." The type of overall community thus envisaged, sufficiently specific both to institutionalize this movement and to guide our present actions in moving towards such an institutionalization, will differ from our own in two obvious and controversial ways. We now identify and respond to social and moral problems and needs in a piecemeal way, problem by separate problem, need by separate need. One group thereby focuses on the deprivations of early childhood, another on those of the old, a third on housing, a fourth on suicide, and so on, each well aware of areas of overlapping concern; but few, if any, are informed by a sufficiently determinate conception of a type of community within which children, the old, and those at various stages in moving from childhood to old age, are each recognized as having their peculiar contribution to make to the common life of the community, through the institutions of a renewed extended family, of a type of schooling which itself extends through the whole of life, and through relationships to property and to money which provide barriers to the kind of acquisitiveness which Aristotle and Aquinas recognized as one form of unjustice, but which in the modern world provides the standard motive for a good

deal of economic activity. So a second salient contrast between the type of community which I am envisaging and contemporary American society emerges. Precisely because those engaged in making and sustaining it will be able to act effectively only if guided by highly determinate conceptions of the institutions and way of life which they are engaged in creating, they will have to exclude and prohibit a variety of types of activity inimical to and destructive of those institutions and that way of life. These exclusions and prohibitions will be the negative aspect of a law, shared respect for which will be a necessary constituent of any community within which such an overall conception of human life is to be realized. It is only through such law that a justice which will have to make upon each of us demands which will have to be expressed in categorical and exceptionless rules, if it is to be a justice in which each person and group receive their due, can be given concrete form. For those educated into and participating in the life of such a community, such a law will be primarily an enabling resource, whose enforcement is understood as the work of the community as a whole. For those external to or not yet educated into full participation in the community's life, it will appear as negative and oppressive, a barrier to a variety of claims to liberty of choice. Such a conception of law, integral as it is to an understanding of justice which requires that no one be excluded from the claims upon them to participate in the tasks of this kind of community, has to extend to the relationships between those outside the community and those within it. In scope of subject matter, as well as in universality, it will have to have the structure of the precepts and arguments of the natural law, whose justification can ultimately only be spelled out, as Aquinas spelled it out, in theological terms. So that not only will those who uphold the authority of the rules which this type of justice requires appear to resist the acknowledgment of what a variety of groups in contemporary society

suppose to be their rights, but they will be seen to do so for theological reasons, reasons carrying no weight for those who aspire to claim such rights. So for this reason too, this type of justice and this type of law will once again inevitably appear to many both negative and obscurantist. Yet now it may seem that this latter part of my argument undermines some of my earlier theses. For I have tried to support the conclusions, first that over a particular range of issues the conditions for rational public debate can no longer be satisfied in the large-scale public arenas of our society, and secondly that to continue to use the dominant idiom of our recent public debates, that of rights, is to risk both misunderstanding and ineffectiveness in such debates. But if the conclusions of the argument which I have latterly been developing are correct, then to replace the rhetoric and idiom of rights by one of law, justice, and a community ordered teleologically to a substantive conception of the ultimate human good will be inescapably to incur incomprehension and hostility. So, what, it may be asked, will have been gained? How will the promotion of rational debate, let alone that of the particular positions which I have been defending, have been furthered? The at first sight disappointing answers are: in the short, or even in the middle run, little or nothing and not at all. But in the longer run it will be very important to have recognized earlier rather than later that the development and the defence of the type of justice of which I have been speaking involves not merely conflict with particular opposing positions within recent largescale public debate, but a rejection of the terms in which such debate has characteristically been framed and by reference to which it has been structured. Failure to achieve such recognition involves us in paying two complementary costs. In the course of framing our denials of what our opponents assert, we are apt to find ourselves quite unintentionally using their vocabulary to do so and thus inadvertently accepting the presuppositions of that vocabulary; yet we are also, because of

our polemical intentions, apt to emphasize unduly points of difference and areas of controversy, so losing our own sense of proportion and perspective. We come to define our own positions and ourselves reactively. These self-imposed distortions of our own positions are particularly harmful insofar as they hinder us from understanding what an Aristotelian and Thomistic conception of justice amounts to in contemporary terms, in that multiplicity of types of situation which need to be recharacterized in terms of a conception of overall community. There is positive work to be done and the limitations and frustrations of controversy with those who accept the contemporary idiom and rhetoric of rights will be apt to prevent us from doing it in the way in which it needs to be done. But if we were, for the moment at least, to a quite new extent to abstain from the controversies of large-scale public debate- to do so completely is not what I am advising- this does not mean that we shall be abandoning the task of presenting our case to those who do not yet accept it. That case has to be presented in two closely related ways. The first is by means of our own practice. We need to *show* as well as to say what an adequate conception of justice amounts to, by constructing the types of institutionalized social relationship within which it becomes visible; and this is in part because we ourselves can only have adequate knowledge of what it amounts to insofar as we understand what its embodied forms are. It is necessary to speak of forms in the plural, because although justice itself is invariant, what justice requires in different specific situations will, as we noticed earlier, vary in far from negligible respects. Secondly, much of our making and remaking of institutions occurs in cooperative enterprises, where other participants initially have a point of view very different from our own. So our disagreements have to be formulated in concrete terms at the level of practice, as we make and remake schools, clinics, workplaces, and other institutions. At this level, such disagreements will be local and

specific, concerned with the ends and thus the goods of particular types of policy, practice, and institution. These ends provide precisely the kind of context needed for an elaboration of what justice requires for its implementation, both in the enforcement of law and in the construction of institutions, in detailed and concrete terms. Thus, it is in the actualities and complexities of practice that we shall be able to find opportunities of a kind generally denied to us in the larger arenas of public debate. By moving to the realm of immediate practice we shall not have abandoned controversy and disagreement; we will, however, have found a way to redefine and restructure them in a way which will perhaps rescue them from the inadequacy and the sterility of the modern idiom and rhetoric of rights.

### **Buying Power**

They are overwhelmingly white, rich, older and male, in a nation that is being remade by the young, by women, and by black and brown voters. Across a sprawling country, they reside in an archipelago of wealth, exclusive neighborhoods dotting a handful of cities and towns. And in an economy that has minted billionaires in a dizzying array of industries, most made their fortunes in just two: finance and energy.

Now they are deploying their vast wealth in the political arena, providing almost half of all the seed money raised to support Democratic and Republican presidential candidates. Just 158 families, along with companies they own or control, contributed \$176 million in the first phase of the campaign, a New York Times investigation found. Not since before Watergate have so few people and businesses provided so much early money in a campaign, most of it through channels legalized by the Supreme Court's Citizens United decision five years ago.

These donors' fortunes reflect the shifting composition of the country's economic elite. Relatively few work in the traditional ranks of corporate America, or hail from dynasties of inherited wealth. Most built their own

businesses, parlaying talent and an appetite for risk into huge wealth: They founded hedge funds in New York, bought up undervalued oil leases in Texas, made blockbusters in Hollywood. More than a dozen of the elite donors were born outside the United States, immigrating from countries like Cuba, the old Soviet Union, Pakistan, India and Israel.

But regardless of industry, the families investing the most in presidential politics overwhelmingly lean right, contributing tens of millions of dollars to support Republican candidates who have pledged to pare regulations; cut taxes on income, capital gains and inheritances; and shrink entitlement programs. While such measures would help protect their own wealth, the donors describe their embrace of them more broadly, as the surest means of promoting economic growth and preserving a system that would allow others to prosper, too.

“It’s a lot of families around the country who are self-made who feel like over-regulation puts these burdens on smaller companies,” said Doug Deason, a Dallas investor whose family put \$5 million behind Gov. Rick Perry of Texas and now, after Mr. Perry’s exit, is being courted by many of the remaining candidates. “They’ve done well. They want to see other people do well.”

In marshaling their financial resources chiefly behind Republican candidates, the donors are also serving as a kind of financial check on demographic forces that have been nudging the electorate toward support for the Democratic Party and its economic policies. Two-thirds of Americans support higher taxes on those earning \$1 million or more a year, according to a June New York Times/CBS News poll, while six in 10 favor more government intervention to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor. According to the Pew Research Center, nearly seven in 10 favor preserving Social Security and Medicare benefits as they are.

Republican candidates have struggled to improve their standing with Hispanic voters, women and African-Americans. But as the campaign unfolds, Republicans are far outpacing Democrats in exploiting the world of “super PACs,” which, unlike candidates’ own campaigns, can raise unlimited sums from any donor, and which have so far amassed the bulk of the money in the election.

The 158 families each contributed \$250,000 or more in the campaign through June 30, according to the most recent available Federal Election Commission filings and other data, while an additional 200 families gave more than \$100,000. Together, the two groups contributed well over half the money in the presidential election -- the vast majority of it supporting Republicans.

“The campaign finance system is now a countervailing force to the way the actual voters of the country are evolving and the policies they want,” said Ruy Teixeira, a political and demographic expert at the left-leaning Center for American Progress.

Like most of the ultrawealthy, the new donor elite is deeply private. Very few of those contacted were willing to speak about their contributions or their political views. Many donations were made from business addresses or post office boxes, or wound through limited liability corporations or trusts, exploiting the new avenues opened up by Citizens United, which gave corporate entities far more leeway to spend money on behalf of candidates. Some contributors, for reasons of privacy or tax planning, are not listed as the owners of the homes where they live, further obscuring the family and social ties that bind them.

But interviews and a review of hundreds of public documents — voter registrations, business records, F.E.C. data and more — reveal a class apart, distant from much of America while geographically, socially and economically intermingling among themselves. Nearly all the neighborhoods where they live would fit within the city limits of New Orleans. But minorities make up less than one-fifth of those neighborhoods’ collective population, and virtually no one is black. Their residents make four and a half times the salary of the average American, and are twice as likely to be college educated.

Most of the families are clustered around just nine cities. Many are neighbors, living near one another in neighborhoods like Bel Air and Brentwood in Los Angeles; River Oaks, a Houston community popular with energy executives; or Indian Creek Village, a private island near Miami that has a private security force and just 35 homes lining an 18-hole golf course.

Sometimes, across party lines, they are patrons of the same symphonies, art museums or at-risk youth programs. They are business partners, in-laws and, on occasion, even poker buddies.

More than 50 members of these families have made the Forbes 400 list of the country’s top billionaires, marking a scale of wealth against which even a million-dollar political contribution can seem relatively small. The Chicago hedge fund billionaire Kenneth C. Griffin, for example, earns about \$68.5 million a month after taxes, according to court filings made by his wife in their divorce. He has given a total of \$300,000 to groups backing Republican presidential candidates. That is a huge sum on its face, yet is the equivalent of only \$21.17 for a typical

American household, according to Congressional Budget Office data on after-tax income.

The donor families' wealth reflects, in part, the vast growth of the financial-services sector and the boom in oil and gas, which have helped transform the American economy in recent decades. They are also the beneficiaries of political and economic forces that are driving widening inequality: As the share of national wealth and income going to the middle class has shrunk, these families are among those whose share has grown.

The accumulation of wealth has been particularly rapid at the elite levels of Wall Street, where financiers who once managed other people's capital now, increasingly, own it themselves. Since 1979, according to one study, the one-tenth of 1 percent of American taxpayers who work in finance have roughly quintupled their share of the country's income. Sixty-four of the families made their wealth in finance, the largest single faction among the super-donors of 2016.

But instead of working their way up to the executive suite at Goldman Sachs or Exxon, most of these donors set out on their own, establishing privately held firms controlled individually or with partners. In finance, they started hedge funds, or formed private equity and venture capital firms, benefiting from favorable tax treatment of debt and capital gains, and more recently from a rising stock market and low interest rates. In energy, some were latter-day wildcatters, early to capitalize on the new drilling technologies and high energy prices that made it economical to exploit shale formations in North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Texas. Others made fortunes supplying those wildcatters with pipelines, trucks and equipment for "fracking."

In both energy and finance, their businesses, when successful, could throw off enormous amounts of cash — unlike industries in which wealth might have been tied up in investments. Those without shareholders or boards of directors have had unusual freedom to indulge their political passions. Together, the two industries accounted for well over half of the cash contributed by the top 158 families.

"When I look at these families, these are highly successful people, they're used to moving mountains, and they love to beat the conventional wisdom," said David McCurdy, a former Oklahoma congressman who is now president of the American Gas Association.

Indeed, while blue-chip corporations largely shy away from super PACs, wary of negative publicity about unlimited campaign spending, these families have poured millions of dollars into such efforts.

Some are even betting on candidates shunned by their party's traditional donor establishment. The three families who have provided the largest donations in the campaign to date — the Wilks family of Texas, which made billions providing trucks and equipment in the shale fields; the Mercers of New York, headed by the hedge fund investor Robert Mercer; and Toby Neugebauer, a Texas-born private equity investor — have backed Senator Ted Cruz of Texas, a socially conservative Tea Party firebrand disdained by Republican leaders.

“Making a big bet on something before anyone else really grasps it. That is what success has in common in energy and in equities,” said Tim Phillips, the president of Americans for Prosperity, a conservative advocacy group with ties to Charles G. and David H. Koch.

A number of the families are tied to networks of ideological donors who, on the left and the right alike, have sought to fundamentally reshape their own political parties. More than a dozen donors or members of their families have been involved with the twice-yearly seminars hosted by the Kochs, whose organizations have pressed the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other business groups to eliminate the Export-Import Bank. They include Mr. Deason and his wife; the brokerage pioneer Charles Schwab, whose wife, Helen, is among the donors; and Karen Buchwald Wright, whose family company makes compressors used to extract and transport natural gas.

“Most of the people at the Koch seminars are entrepreneurs who have built it from the ground up — they built it themselves,” said Mr. Deason, who said he supported eliminating corporate subsidies and welfare, including those that benefit his own investments.

Another group of the families, including the hedge fund investor George Soros and his son Jonathan, have ties to the Democracy Alliance, a network of liberal donors who have pushed Democrats to move aggressively on climate change legislation and progressive taxation. Those donors, many of them from Hollywood or Wall Street, have put millions of dollars behind Hillary Rodham Clinton.

The families who give do so, to some extent, because of personal, regional and professional ties to the candidates. Jeb Bush's father made money in the oil

business, while Mr. Bush himself earned millions of dollars on Wall Street. Some of the candidates most popular among ultrawealthy donors have also served in elected office in Florida and Texas, two states that are home to many of the affluent families on the list.

Two of the donors live on Indian Creek Island Road in Florida, the most expensive street in the United States, according to Zillow. Richard Cavalleri/Shutterstock

But the giving, more broadly, reflects the political stakes this year for the families and businesses that have moved most aggressively to take advantage of Citizens United, particularly in the energy and finance industries.

The Obama administration, Democrats in Congress and even Mr. Bush have argued for tax and regulatory shifts that could subject many venture capital and private equity firms to higher levels of corporate or investment taxation. Hedge funds, which historically were lightly regulated, are bound by new rules with the Dodd-Frank regulations, which several Republican candidates have pledged to roll back and which Mrs. Clinton has pledged to defend.

And while the shale boom has generated new fortunes, it has also produced a glut of oil that is now driving down prices. Most in the industry favor lifting the 40-year-old ban on exporting oil, which would give domestic producers access to new customers overseas, and approval of the controversial Keystone XL oil pipeline.

“They don’t want anything from the government except that they’d like to export oil, and most of them want the Keystone pipeline,” T. Boone Pickens, the investor and natural gas advocate, said about his colleagues in the energy business.

“If you look at the oil and gas industry, it has done wonders for the country. They paid a lot of taxes, and people still attack you,” said Mr. Pickens, who has donated \$125,000 to groups supporting Mr. Bush or Carly Fiorina. “They’re entrepreneurs, and they have opinions about everything.”

## Awareness-raising makes you sick

There is an idea popularised by the sociologist Robert Merton called ‘the law of unintended consequences’. While, as we all know, unintended consequences can be serendipitous in nature, the phrase is more often used to refer to the unforeseen negative outcomes that can result from our actions. The law alerts us to the possibility that, at times, those with the best of intentions are the ones who can do most harm. This is something that many of those behind the ubiquitous ‘awareness raising’ campaigns we have today could do with reflecting on.

Presented as progressive in nature, such campaigns usually aim to increase our knowledge of a variety of issues, alongside raising funds for specific causes. However, far from being progressive, or even benign in nature, there are many negative aspects to the current trend of awareness-raising.

First, there is the ubiquity of the awareness-raising messages. A cursory glance at Project Britain’s calendar of awareness-raising events shows us that, in March 2015 alone, numerous awareness-raising events are taking place, including ‘Brain Awareness Week’, ‘World Glaucoma Week’ and ‘World Kidney Day’. As the year goes on, we will have our awareness raised about many other issues, including child abuse, alcohol misuse, domestic abuse, heart disease, cancer, stress and a variety of mental-health problems. Looking at this list, it would appear that a lack of awareness is the No1. problem facing humanity today. As one commentator, tongue firmly in cheek, put it, ‘if there is anything more important than raising awareness’ he is not aware of it.

Far from helping us to grapple with society’s problems, such campaigns only work to increase our anxiety, bombarding the public with a bewildering and never-ending slew of messages that tell us we are at risk from myriad threats. However, such pernicious effects stem from a more profound political problem. Awareness-raising campaigns are frequently presented as a form of political action; by raising people’s awareness, campaigners say, they are empowering them to take control over their lives. However, the focus of these campaigns is more often focused on our own lifestyles and relationships, rather than on any broader political project. As I have pointed out previously on *spiked*, the concept of personal empowerment is more often used to draw people into forms of state governance, over which they have little meaningful control.

Indeed, the current obsession with 'raising awareness' actually represents the negation of political action, and its replacement by a form of top-down, therapeutic moralising. For some activists, awareness-raising is the contemporary equivalent of the consciousness-raising political action of the Sixties and Seventies. For many on the left in the Sixties, the problem was that the masses, unlike themselves of course, suffered from 'false consciousness', blinding them to the reality of their oppression. Similarly, today's campaigners see a lack of awareness as the problem dooming the masses to disease and despair. In each case, there is a clear moral line being drawn – in the former, between those with true consciousness and those with false consciousness; in the latter, between the aware and the unaware.

Such top-down approaches to social and political issues miss the collective dimension of politics. Yes, people have views that they think correct, and consequently think that those with opposing views are wrong. But it is through a process of struggle, argument and reflection that political consciousness is shaped. Top-down 'truth telling' is a meagre substitute for this process.

However, there is one key difference between the consciousness-raisers of the Sixties and the awareness-raisers of today. At least, the activists of the Sixties saw their role as spreading a particular message. By contrast, the activists of today are more interested in displaying their own awareness – through wristbands and ribbons – rather than spreading it.

In an illuminating analysis of the rise of 'ribbon culture' – the trend for people to wear awareness ribbons and charity wristbands – Sarah Moore notes that many wristband and ribbon wearers have little specific knowledge of the charity, illness or issue symbolised by the ribbon they are wearing. She notes how, for some, the choice of which ribbon to wear was made on the basis of which one best matched the clothes they were wearing that day.

Moore goes on to note that wearing a ribbon or wristband was often done as a means of demonstrating that the wearer was in a state of self-awareness, as opposed to being aware of a specific cause or issue. In other words, it was an expression of the self, of the wearer's moral status as 'aware', that was being presented for public consumption. Showing awareness, then, becomes an act of self-expression, deprived of a political outlook or frame of reference. This is particularly true of ribbons which promote health-related causes, which become a display of the individual's awareness of health risks and their commitment to avoiding them. In this sense, the focus of awareness-raising becomes the

survival of the self – a desire to prevent death rather than an affirmation of life and the political possibilities therein.

Far from being benign, the cult of awareness-raising has a clear and detrimental effect. In order to combat such a corrosive trend, and reinvigorate the public and political sphere, we must raise awareness of the dangers of awareness-raising

### **Slavery and Capitalism**

Few topics have animated today's chattering classes more than capitalism. In the wake of the global economic crisis, the discussion has spanned political boundaries, with conservative newspapers in Britain and Germany running stories on the "future of capitalism" (as if that were in doubt) and Korean Marxists analyzing its allegedly self-destructive tendencies. Pope Francis has made capitalism a central theme of his papacy, while the French economist Thomas Piketty attained rock-star status with a 700-page book full of tables and statistics and the succinct but decisively unsexy title *Capital in the Twenty-First Century* (Harvard University Press).

With such contemporary drama, historians have taken notice. They observe, quite rightly, that the world we live in cannot be understood without coming to terms with the long history of capitalism—a process that has arguably unfolded over more than half a millennium. They are further encouraged by the all-too-frequent failings of economists, who have tended to naturalize particular economic arrangements by defining the "laws" of their development with mathematical precision and preferring short-term over long-term perspectives. What distinguishes today's historians of capitalism is that they insist on its contingent nature, tracing how it has changed over time as it has revolutionized societies, technologies, states, and many if not all facets of life.

Nowhere is this scholarly trend more visible than in the United States. And no issue currently attracts more attention than the relationship between capitalism and slavery.

If capitalism, as many believe, is about wage labor, markets, contracts, and the rule of law, and, most important, if it is based on the idea that markets naturally tend toward maximizing human freedom, then how do we understand slavery's role within it? No other national story raises that question

with quite the same urgency as the history of the United States: The quintessential capitalist society of our time, it also looks back on long complicity with slavery. But the topic goes well beyond one nation. The relationship of slavery and capitalism is, in fact, one of the keys to understanding the origins of the modern world.

For too long, many historians saw no problem in the opposition between capitalism and slavery. They depicted the history of American capitalism without slavery, and slavery as quintessentially noncapitalist. Instead of analyzing it as the modern institution that it was, they described it as premodern: cruel, but marginal to the larger history of capitalist modernity, an unproductive system that retarded economic growth, an artifact of an earlier world. Slavery was a Southern pathology, invested in mastery for mastery's sake, supported by fanatics, and finally removed from the world stage by a costly and bloody war.

Some scholars have always disagree with such accounts. In the 1930s and 1940s, C.L.R. James and Eric Williams argued for the centrality of slavery to capitalism, though their findings were largely ignored. Nearly half a century later, two American economists, Stanley L. Engerman and Robert William Fogel, observed in their controversial book *Time on the Cross* (Little, Brown, 1974) the modernity and profitability of slavery in the United States. Now a flurry of books and conferences are building on those often unacknowledged foundations. They emphasize the dynamic nature of New World slavery, its modernity, profitability, expansiveness, and centrality to capitalism in general and to the economic development of the United States in particular.

The historians Robin Blackburn in England, Rafael Marquese in Brazil, Dale Tomich in the United States, and Michael Zeuske in Germany led the study of slavery in the Atlantic world. They have now been joined by a group of mostly younger American historians, like Walter Johnson, Seth Rockman, Caitlin C. Rosenthal, and Edward E. Baptist looking at the United States.

While their works differ, often significantly, all insist that slavery was a key part of American capitalism—especially during the 19th century, the moment when the institution became inextricable from the expansion of modern industry—and to the development of the United States as a whole.

For the first half of the 19th century, slavery was at the core of the American economy. The South was an economically dynamic part of the nation (for its white citizens); its products not only established the United States' position in

the global economy but also created markets for agricultural and industrial goods grown and manufactured in New England and the mid-Atlantic states. More than half of the nation's exports in the first six decades of the 19th century consisted of raw cotton, almost all of it grown by slaves. In an important book, *River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom* (Harvard University Press, 2013), Johnson observes that steam engines were more prevalent on the Mississippi River than in the New England countryside, a telling detail that testifies to the modernity of slavery. Johnson sees slavery not just as an integral part of American capitalism, but as its very essence. To slavery, a correspondent from Savannah noted in the publication *Southern Cultivator*, "does this country largely—very largely—owe its greatness in commerce, manufactures, and its general prosperity."

Much of the recent work confirms that 1868 observation, taking us outside the major slaveholding areas themselves and insisting on the national importance of slavery, all the way up to its abolition in 1865. In these accounts, slavery was just as present in the counting houses of Lower Manhattan, the spinning mills of New England, and the workshops of budding manufacturers in the Blackstone Valley in Massachusetts and Rhode Island as on the plantations in the Yazoo-Mississippi Delta. The slave economy of the Southern states had ripple effects throughout the entire economy, not just shaping but dominating it.

Merchants in New York City, Boston, and elsewhere, like the Browns in cotton and the Taylors in sugar, organized the trade of slave-grown agricultural commodities, accumulating vast riches in the process. Sometimes the connections to slavery were indirect, but not always: By the 1840s, James Brown was sitting in his counting house in Lower Manhattan hiring overseers for the slave plantations that his defaulting creditors had left to him. Since planters needed ever more funds to invest in land and labor, they drew on global capital markets; without access to the resources of New York and London, the expansion of slave agriculture in the American South would have been all but impossible.

The profits accumulated through slave labor had a lasting impact. Both the Browns and the Taylors eventually moved out of commodities and into banking. The Browns created an institution that partially survives to this day as Brown Brothers, Harriman & Co., while Moses Taylor took charge of the precursor of Citibank. Some of the 19th century's most important financiers—including the Barings and Rothschilds—were deeply involved in the "Southern trade," and the profits they accumulated were eventually reinvested in other

sectors of the global economy. As a group of freedmen in Virginia observed in 1867, "our wives, our children, our husbands, have been sold over and over again to purchase the lands we now locate upon. ... And then didn't we clear the land, and raise the crops of corn, of tobacco, of rice, of sugar, of every thing. And then didn't the large cities in the North grow up on the cotton and the sugars and the rice that we made?" Slavery, they understood, was inscribed into the very fabric of the American economy.

Southern slavery was important to American capitalism in other ways as well. As management scholars and historians have discovered in recent years, innovations in tabulating the cost and productivity of labor derived from the world of plantations. They were unusual work sites in that owners enjoyed nearly complete control over their workers and were thus able to reinvent the labor process and the accounting for it—a power that no manufacturer enjoyed in the mid-19th century.

As Caitlin Rosenthal has shown, slave labor allowed the enslavers to experiment in novel ways with labor control. Edward E. Baptist, who has studied in great detail the work practices on plantations and emphasized their modernity in *The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of Modern Capitalism* (Basic Books), has gone so far as to argue that as new methods of labor management entered the repertoire of plantation owners, torture became widely accepted. Slave plantations, not railroads, were in fact America's first "big business."

Moreover, as Seth Rockman has shown, the slave-dominated economy of the South also constituted an important market for goods produced by a wide variety of Northern manufacturers and artisans. Supplying plantations clothing and brooms, plows and fine furniture, Northern businesses dominated the large market in the South, which itself did not see significant industrialization before the end of the 19th century.

Further, as all of us learned in school, industrialization in the United States focused at first largely on cotton manufacturing: the spinning of cotton thread with newfangled machines and eventually the weaving of that thread with looms powered at first by water and then by steam. The raw material that went into the factories was grown almost exclusively by slaves. Indeed, the large factories emerging along the rivers of New England, with their increasing number of wage workers, cannot be imagined without reliable, ever-increasing supplies of ever-cheaper raw cotton. The Cabots, Lowells, and Slaters—

whatever their opinions on slavery—all profited greatly from the availability of cheap, slave-grown cotton.

As profits accumulated in the cotton trade, in cotton manufacturing, in cotton growing, and in supplying Southern markets, many cultural, social, and educational institutions benefited: congregations, hospitals, universities. Given that the United States in the first half of the 19th century was a society permeated by slavery and its earnings, it is hardly surprising that institutions that at first glance seem far removed from the violence of plantation life came to be implicated in slavery as well.

Craig Steven Wilder has shown in *Ebony and Ivy: Race, Slavery, and the Troubled History of America's Universities* (Bloomsbury, 2013) how Brown and Harvard Universities, among others, drew donations from merchants involved in the slave trade, had cotton manufacturers on their boards, trained generations of Southern elites who returned home to a life of violent mastery, and played central roles in creating the ideological underpinnings of slavery.

By 1830, one million Americans, most of them enslaved, grew cotton. Raw cotton was the most important export of the United States, at the center of America's financial flows and emerging modern business practices, and at the core of its first modern manufacturing industry. As John Brown, a fugitive slave, observed in 1854: "When the price [of cotton] rises in the English market, the poor slaves immediately feel the effects, for they are harder driven, and the whip is kept more constantly going."

Just as cotton, and with it slavery, became key to the U.S. economy, it also moved to the center of the world economy and its most consequential transformations: the creation of a globally interconnected economy, the Industrial Revolution, the rapid spread of capitalist social relations in many parts of the world, and the Great Divergence—the moment when a few parts of the world became quite suddenly much richer than every other part. The humble fiber, transformed into yarn and cloth, stood at the center of the emergence of the industrial capitalism that is so familiar to us today. Our modern world originates in the cotton factories, cotton ports, and cotton plantations of the 18th and 19th centuries. The United States was just one nexus in a much larger story that connected artisans in India, European manufacturers, and, in the Americas, African slaves and land-grabbing settlers. It was those connections, over often vast distances, that created an empire of cotton—and with it modern capitalism.

To understand American slavery, we need to analyze the relative strength of social and political structures in places such as the 18th-century Ottoman Empire and 1840s western India. To understand capitalism's relationship to slavery, we need to see the control of cultivators in Africa over their land and labor, as well as the transformations of the Indian countryside, the institutional structures of capitalism in Britain, and the state structures of Egypt.

It is at this point that the history of capitalism connects in refreshing ways with another important emerging field, global history. As is widely known, history as an academic discipline emerged hand-in-hand with the modern nation-state, and indeed played an important part in its constitution. It is for this reason that most history has been framed within the borders of modern states. In recent years, however, some historians have tried to think beyond such frameworks, bringing together stories of regional or even global scope—for example, Charles S. Maier's *Leviathan 2.0: Inventing Modern Statehood* (Harvard University Press) and Jürgen Osterhammel's *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton University Press).

Within that literature, economic history has played a particularly important role, with trailblazing works such as Kenneth Pomeranz's *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (Princeton, 2000) and Marcel van der Linden's *Workers of the World: Essays Toward a Global Labor History* (Brill, 2008). Economic history, which for so long has been focused mostly on "national" questions—the "coming of managerial capitalism" in the United States, "organized capitalism" in Germany, the "sprouts of capitalism" in China—now increasingly tackles broader questions, looking at capitalism as a global system.

When we apply a global perspective, we develop a new appreciation for the centrality of slavery, in the United States and elsewhere, in the emergence of modern capitalism. We can also understand how that dependence on slavery was eventually overcome later in the 19th century. We come to understand that the ability of European merchants to secure ever-greater quantities of cotton cloth from South Asia in the 17th and 18th centuries was crucial to the trans-Atlantic slave trade, as cloth came to be the core commodity exchanged for slaves on the western coast of Africa. We grasp that the rapidly expanding markets for South Asian cloth in Europe and elsewhere motivated Europeans to enter the cotton-manufacturing industry, which had flourished elsewhere in the world for millennia.

And a global perspective allows us to comprehend in new ways how slavery became central to the Industrial Revolution. As machine production of cotton textiles expanded in Britain and continental Europe, traditional sources of raw cotton—especially cultivators in the Ottoman Empire as well as in Africa and India—proved insufficient. With European merchants unable to encourage the monocultural production of cotton in these regions and to transform peasant agriculture, they began to draw on slave-grown cotton, at first from the West Indies and Brazil, and by the 1790s especially in the United States.

As a result, Europe's ability to industrialize rested at first entirely on the control of expropriated lands and enslaved labor in the Americas. It was able to escape the constraints on its own resources—no cotton, after all, was grown in Europe—because of its increasing and often violent domination of global trade networks, along with the control of huge territories in the Americas. For the first 80 years of modern industry, the only significant quantities of raw cotton entering European markets were produced by slaves—and not from the vastly larger cotton harvests of China or India.

By 1800, 25 percent of the cotton that landed in Liverpool, the world's most important cotton port, originated in the United States; 20 years later, that proportion had increased to 59 percent; by 1850, 72 percent of the cotton consumed in Britain was grown in the United States, with similar proportions for other European countries. A global perspective lets us see that the ability to secure more and cheaper cotton gave European and North American manufacturers the ability to increase the production of cheap yarn and cloth, which in turn allowed them to capture ancient cotton markets in Asia, Africa, and elsewhere, furthering a wave of deindustrialization in those parts of the world. Innovations in long-distance trade, the investment of capital over long distances, and the institutions in which this new form of capitalist globalization were embedded all derived from a global trade dominated by slave labor and colonial expansion.

A global perspective on the history of cotton also shows that slave labor is as much a sign of the weakness as of the strength of Western capital and states. The ability to subdue labor in distant locations testified to the accumulated power of European and North American capital owners. Yet it also showed their inability to transform peasant agriculture. It was only in the last third of the 19th century that peasant producers in places such as Central Asia, West Africa, India, and upcountry Georgia, in the United States, could be integrated into the global empire of cotton, making a world possible in which the growing of cotton for industry expanded drastically without resort to enslaving the

world's cotton workers. Indeed, one of the weaknesses of a perspective that focuses almost exclusively on the fabulously profitable slave/cotton complex of the antebellum American South is its inability to explain the emergence of an empire of cotton without slavery.

We cannot know if the cotton industry was the only possible way into the modern industrial world, but we do know that it was the path to global capitalism. We do not know if Europe and North America could have grown rich without slavery, but we do know that industrial capitalism and the Great Divergence in fact emerged from the violent caldron of slavery, colonialism, and the expropriation of land. In the first 300 years of the expansion of capitalism, particularly the moment after 1780 when it entered into its decisive industrial phase, it was not the small farmers of the rough New England countryside who established the United States' economic position. It was the backbreaking labor of unremunerated American slaves in places like South Carolina, Mississippi, and Alabama.

When we marshal big arguments about the West's superior economic performance, and build these arguments upon an account of the West's allegedly superior institutions like private-property rights, lean government, and the rule of law, we need to remember that the world Westerners forged was equally characterized by exactly the opposite: vast confiscation of land and labor, huge state intervention in the form of colonialism, and the rule of violence and coercion. And we also need to qualify the fairy tale we like to tell about capitalism and free labor. Global capitalism is characterized by a whole variety of labor regimes, one of which, a crucial one, was slavery.

During its heyday, however, slavery was seen as essential to the economy of the Western world. No wonder *The Economist* worried in September 1861, when Union General John C. Frémont emancipated slaves in Missouri, that such a "fearful measure" might spread to other slaveholding states, "inflict[ing] utter ruin and universal desolation on those fertile territories"—and on the merchants of Boston and New York, "whose prosperity ... has always been derived" to a large extent from those territories. Slavery did not die because it was unproductive or unprofitable, as some earlier historians have argued. Slavery was not some feudal remnant on the way to extinction. It died because of violent struggle, because enslaved workers continually challenged the people who held them in bondage—nowhere more successfully than in the 1790s in the French colony of Saint-Domingue (now Haiti, site of the first free nation of color in the New World), and because a courageous group of

abolitionists struggled against some of the dominant economic interests of their time.

A contributing factor in the death of slavery was the fact that it was a system not just of labor exploitation but of rule that drew in particular ways on state power. Southern planters had enormous political power. They needed it: to protect the institution of slavery itself, to expand its reach into ever more lands, to improve infrastructures, and to position the United States within the global economy as an exporter of agricultural commodities.

In time, the interests of the South conflicted more and more with those of a small but growing group of Northern industrialists, farmers, and workers. Able to mobilize labor through wage payments, Northerners demanded a strong state to raise tariffs, build infrastructures conducive to domestic industrialization, and guarantee the territorial extension of free labor in the United States. Afraid that they were losing control over essential levers of power, slaveowners tried to strike out on their own.

After the Civil War, a new kind of capitalism arose, in the United States and elsewhere. Yet that new capitalism—characterized first and foremost by states with unprecedented bureaucratic, infrastructural, and military capacities, and by wage labor—had been enabled by the profits, institutions, networks, technologies, and innovations that emerged from slavery, colonialism, and land expropriation.

That legacy is still with us today. The great inequalities, both domestically and internationally, that characterize the world we live in are at least partly the result of capitalism's long and violent history.

There are still many open questions about slavery and capitalism, some specific, some broad. We have not yet conclusively shown, for example, how methods of labor control migrated from the world of the plantation to the world of the factory. We need more-detailed research on where the profits from slavery accumulated in Europe and the American North, and how they mattered to other sectors of the economy. We would benefit from a better understanding of how the tight economic connection between Northern entrepreneurs and slavery came to be undone. And we have only begun to account for what the rethinking of slavery does to our more general understanding of capitalism.

But what we do know is that the histories of slavery and of capitalism look very different if we understand them in relation to each other. The next time we walk the streets of Lower Manhattan or the grounds of Harvard University, we should think at least in passing of the millions of enslaved workers who helped make some of that grandeur possible, and to the ways that slavery's legacy persists today.